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ABSTRACT 
While civil procedure reforms are often said to be based on concerns of effi-
ciency and economy, This article argues that civil justice reforms are also part of 
any nation’s project of national identity and state building. A robust civil justice 
system is a statement of national progress and reforms to the system are less a re-
flection of a “civil justice crisis,” and more a result of political bartering and de-
bates about a nation’s identity. This can be seen in European countries’ recent ef-
forts to coordinate procedural systems even as they are called to define 
themselves as member states of the European Union. As this article will docu-
ment, this is similarly true in China and in the United States, where civil proce-
dure reforms have matched critical stages of state building and national expan-
sion. But interestingly, this article concludes that despite the different polity of the 
two countries, recent changes in civil procedures may be similarly counter-
productive to the raison d’être of the procedures sought to be reformed, rather 
than supportive of their ideals. The effect of these changes, in the case of the 
United States can be counter-democratic, and in China, counter-harmonious. 
*   *   * 
[Legal procedure is a] ritual of extreme social significance. If we can appreci-
ate the meaning of this ritual in the case of our own and even one other com-
munity, we obtain a remarkable insight into the fundamental and largely un-
formulated beliefs accepted by, and acceptable to, these societies; we begin to 
understand their collective and perhaps contrasted social sense of what is just 
and fair.1 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is my great pleasure to write in appreciation of my friend and colleague 
Steve Subrin. Professor Subrin’s scholarly contributions to the field of Ameri-
can civil procedure are substantial and well known. Through his detailed analy-
sis of legal history, he uncovered much about the drafting and the evolution of 
the federal rules of civil procedure. In focusing on the historical and social der-
ivation of the federal rules, Professor Subrin truly understood what the noted 
anthropologist Clifford Geertz has observed about law; that is, “law . . . work[s] 
by the light of local knowledge.”2 In other words, law is embedded in the cul-
ture of place and time. In order to understand law, one must not simply know 
the rules, but also their derivation, the choices they represent, the policies be-
hind them, and how they actually operate in practice. 
But perhaps lesser known is Professor Subrin’s comparative and global in-
terest.3 In the years 2000 to 2002, Professor Subrin and I participated in an aca-
demic exchange with German and Chinese civil procedure scholars. At the 
time, Chinese reformers were avidly looking abroad for different models in 
their efforts to improve China’s civil justice system. With the support of the 
Ford Foundation,4 we delivered a series of lectures that explored the pros and 
cons of the American adversary system and explained the sometimes arcane 
technicalities of American civil procedure in its social and historical context. 
Our lectures eventually led to the publication of Litigating in America: Civil 
Procedure in Context,5 which was translated into Chinese and published and 
distributed widely in China. Throughout this project, we attempted to address 
the “whys” rather than the “hows” of American civil procedure. 
This article arises in part from that project and from Professor Subrin’s ar-
gument that we are now witnessing a fourth era in American civil procedure, an 
era that is characterized by a loss of both orality and trial.6 We need to under-
stand this new era from a comparative and global perspective. What can we 
learn from the experiences of other systems? Rather than assuming universal 
                                                        
2  CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective, in 
LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 167, 167 (1983). 
3  See Stephen N. Subrin, Discovery in Global Perspective: Are We Nuts?, 52 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 299 (2002). 
4  Founded by Edsel Ford and Henry Ford in 1936, the Foundation is a globally oriented pri-
vate foundation with the goal of advancing human welfare. See FORD FOUNDATION, 
http://www.fordfoundation.org/ (last visited May, 13, 2015). 
5  STEPHEN N. SUBRIN & MARGARET Y.K. WOO, LITIGATING IN AMERICA: CIVIL PROCEDURE 
IN CONTEXT (2006). 
6  According to Subrin & Main, there have previously been three eras in American civil pro-
cedure: the first era begins with the country’s founding; in the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury, the introduction of code pleading launched the second era; and the third era com-
menced in 1938 with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas 
O. Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil Procedure, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1839 (2014). 
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answers, can we understand our choices more fully by reference to other sys-
tems?7 
Indeed, from China to the United States, civil procedure reform is the man-
tra of the day.8 Civil justice reforms are attributed to perceived increases in 
caseload, overburdened judges, and delayed justice. As a whole, tactics to ad-
dress this “crisis” have focused on efficiency and economy and include such 
methods as increased case management, encouragement of alternative dispute 
resolution, and greater pressure on parties to move the case along or face penal-
ties.9 So, if there is a fourth era in civil procedure, as Subrin and Thomas Main 
argue, how has this fourth era been uniquely American and how has each na-
tion responded to this global trend? 
While civil procedure reforms are often said to be based on concerns of ef-
ficiency and economy, I would argue that civil justice reforms are also part of 
any nation’s project of national identity and state building. A robust civil jus-
tice system is a statement of national progress and reforms to the system are 
less a reflection of a “civil justice crisis,” and more a result of political barter-
ing10 and debates about a nation’s identity. This can be seen in European coun-
tries’ recent efforts to coordinate procedural systems even as they are called to 
define themselves as member states of the European Union.11 As this article 
                                                        
7  There are a few excellent comparative studies of civil procedure by American legal schol-
ars. See Scott Dodson & James M. Klebba, Global Civil Procedure Trends in the Twenty-
First Century, 34 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (2011); Richard Marcus, ‘American Excep-
tionalism’ in Goals for Civil Litigation, in GOALS OF CIVIL JUSTICE AND CIVIL PROCEDURE IN 
CONTEMPORARY JUDICIAL SYSTEMS 123 (Alan Uzelac ed., 2014); S.I. Strong, Regulatory Lit-
igation in the European Union: Does the U.S. Class Action Have a New Analogue, 88 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 899 (2012). 
8  This can be seen in civil procedure reforms in the Netherlands, Austria, Germany, France, 
England, and China. 
9  Thus, for example, Lord Justice Woolf was appointed in 1996 to review the rules and pro-
cedure of the civil courts in England and Wales with the expressed aim of improving access 
to justice and lowering the cost of litigation. Lord Justice Woolf’s recommendations resulted 
in a revision of English civil procedure rules in 1999. See TAMARA GORIELY, RICHARD 
MOORHEAD & PAMELA ABRAMS, MORE CIVIL JUSTICE? THE IMPACT OF THE WOOLF REFORMS 
ON PRE-ACTION BEHAVIOUR (2002), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org 
/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/MoreCivilJustice_R43Report_v1.pdf; see also CIVIL 
LITIGATION IN CHINA AND EUROPE: ESSAYS ON THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE AND THE PARTIES 
(C.H. van Rhee & Fu Yulin eds., 2014). 
10  Of course, the historical fact that the rulemaking process is one of political bartering has 
been documented by Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Back-
ground of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691 (1998) and Paul D. Car-
rington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on Experience, 60 DUKE L.J. 
597 (2010). The controversial Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 presents the more recent 
example of politics and rulemaking. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Act of 2005 
in Historical Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439 (2008); Edward A. Pur-
cell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and the New in Federal Ju-
risdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823 (2008). 
11  The European Union’s efforts to harmonize domestic procedural law for its member states 
proved to be controversial, as member states remained loyal to its nationalistic features. To 
date, apart from the fundamental fair process guarantee contained in Article 6 of the Europe-
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will document, this is similarly true in China and in the United States where 
civil procedure reforms have matched critical stages of state building and na-
tional expansion. 
And so, this article takes a comparative look at how civil procedure re-
forms have added to the national identity of these two countries—China and the 
United States But interestingly, this article concludes that despite the seemingly 
different polity of the two countries, recent changes in civil procedures may be 
similarly counter-productive to the raison d’être of the procedures sought to be 
reformed, rather than supportive of their ideals. In both the United States and 
China, reforms to the sufficiency of the complaint standard and the changing 
role of judges have resulted in the closing of the courthouse gates. These recent 
changes have added to greater centralized state authority as judges dispose of 
cases at an early stage and litigants’ voices and disputes are left to be resolved 
outside the courthouse gates. The effect of these changes, in the case of the 
United States may be counter-democratic, and in China, counter-harmonious. 
I. COURTS AND THE NATION-STATE 
As Martin Shapiro so aptly pointed out, courts legitimize governments.12 
They funnel disputes back to the state and in the process validate the state’s as-
sertion of power. Consistent with this idea, challenges to court judgments are 
addressed internally through a hierarchical appeals process, which reaffirms 
successive applications of state authority. Challenged judgments get reviewed 
by the state and are processed upwards through the court system. Social discon-
tent is contained within the system and without resort to protesting in the 
streets.13 Even contests to governmental action can be channeled into judicial 
                                                                                                                                
an Convention on Human Rights and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, harmonization of civil procedure rules is rather limited and focused ex-
pressly on international cases, leaving purely national cases outside the discussion. See C.H. 
van Rhee, Harmonisation of Civil Procedure: An Historical and Comparative Perspective, 
in CIVIL LITIGATION IN A GLOBALISING WORLD 39 (X.E. Kramer & C.H. van Rhee eds., 
2012). Similarly, Japan’s 2003 reforms, which focused on reducing delays and increasing 
participation, resulted in more case management and the introduction of lay jurors to im-
portant criminal cases. These reforms also coincided with Japan’s economic crisis, and their 
combined psychological effect on Japanese citizens resulted in the birth of a new national-
ism. See Eugene A. Matthews, Japan’s New Nationalism, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.–Dec. 2003, at 
74. 
12  According to Shapiro, it is a reciprocal dependency in which courts derive legitimacy 
from the political system (rather than from some abstract prototype model of courts) and the 
political system in turn derives some of its legitimacy from the courts. MARTIN SHAPIRO, 
COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 17–18 (1986); see also Strong, supra 
note 7 (examining the effort to develop a Europe-wide approach to collective actions). 
13  See Charles Epp’s argument that the ascendancy of civil rights and liberties has rested on 
the democratization of access to the courts. CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: 
LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 5 (1998). In 
China, the language of rights has lent support to peaceful resistance even as access to courts 
is often denied. See KEVIN J. O’BRIEN & LIANJIANG LI, RIGHTFUL RESISTANCE IN RURAL 
CHINA, at xiii (2006). 
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institutions that affirm the legitimacy of the state even as they resolve the dis-
pute. 
In the common law world, courts even have the opportunity to interpret 
and change laws with published judicial opinions that serve as legal authority 
applicable to the next new set of facts. In the constant reapplication and reinter-
pretation of law to new facts as brought and argued before the court by private 
litigants, voices of ordinary citizens are incorporated into the enforcement and 
application of law. Across the board and top down, social norms are adjusted to 
a more nuanced populist parameter. 
And so, the growth of courts is often synonymous with the assertion and 
growth of governmental powers. What varies in different legal systems is the 
extent to which ordinary citizens can shape and control their disputes in court. 
In other words, in the courthouse, the delicate balance between state authority 
and private citizens plays out over and over again. Such a balance requires the 
mediation of civil procedure rules, which distribute power between the trinity 
of judges, lawyers, and litigants, and the rules vary depending on the particular 
polity. And jurisdictional rules in delimiting the physical and legal borders of 
the court call forth even more starkly the tensions between national borders and 
authority, as well as national and state borders and authorities. 
A. Courts and U.S. Federalization 
Thus, in critical periods of U.S. federalization and national state building, 
the jurisdiction of U.S. federal courts has expanded to empower the courts. This 
meant the expansion of U.S. federal courts domestically as well as internation-
ally. As documented by many of the scholars here, the twentieth century saw 
the global growth of federal courts both jurisprudentially as well as physically 
in the assertion of U.S. legality. This was done through both enlarging subject 
matter jurisdiction to empower federal judicial authority over a panoply of sub-
ject matter disputes and easing personal jurisdiction requirements to empower 
judicial authority over defendants based on “minimum contacts” with the forum 
state. 
As has been so carefully documented by Judith Resnik, such expansions 
occurred after the critical nation-building periods of the Civil War, the New 
Deal, and the civil rights era of the 1960s.14 Thus, for example, in the 1860s 
and 1870s after the divisive Civil War, the U.S. Congress deployed the federal 
courts as an instrument of central control over state authorities by authorizing 
the federal judiciary to hear cases that included civil rights, habeas corpus, and 
other claims arising under general “federal question” jurisdiction.15 As pointed 
                                                        
14  See Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of 
Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 934 (2000) (“[T]he beginnings of the twentieth century 
brought widespread interest in professionalization, nationalization, and reorganization.”). 
15  Indeed, the fear of the federal courts by Anti-Federalists was such that the original “feder-
al question” jurisdiction was not granted until 1875 and it was passed only as “sneak” legis-
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out by Frankfurter and Landis, while Congress had extended the removal juris-
diction of the inferior federal courts whenever sectional opposition to national 
policy was reflected by the state judiciary, it was the nationalism produced 
post-civil war that set the stage for the passage of an Act which can be regarded 
as the “culmination of a movement . . . to strengthen the Federal Government 
against the states.”16 
The growth of the federal judiciary’s docket continued on through the New 
Deal as Congress used the federal courts to craft and implement national agen-
das in response to the economic crisis posed by the Great Depression.17 This 
was again true after the height of the civil rights movement when race relations 
threatened to divide the country. Street protests were funneled to the courts and 
since 1974, 474 jurisdictional grants expanded the workload and jurisdiction of 
the federal courts.18 
Similarly, the expansion of personal jurisdiction moved U.S. courts’ “long 
arm” reach over out-of-state defendants from a physical presence requirement 
solely to one that includes “minimum contacts.”19 This has essentially allowed 
American courts to extend their jurisdictional reach over defendants as long as 
the defendant’s conduct giving rise to the controversy can be said to be “di-
rected” at the forum state.20 This “minimum contacts” standard, along with the 
“tag jurisdiction” of physical presence,21 allows U.S. courts to assert unusual 
power over out-of-state defendants when such contacts would not typically 
serve as the basis of jurisdiction for courts in other countries. This “minimum 
contacts” requirement marks the U.S. courts as uniquely expansive in the world 
for the assertion of personal jurisdiction over defendants.22 
Even recent efforts to harmonize civil procedure have not brought the 
United States in step with the rest of the world. The latest ALI/UNIDROIT 
Principles on Transnational Civil Procedure, drafted by the American Law In-
                                                                                                                                
lation as it was in the form of a bill to amend the removal statute. James H. Chadbourn & A. 
Leo Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 U. PA. L. REV. 639 (1942). It was 
with such casualness that the federal courts ceased to be limited to diversity jurisdiction to 
become “primary and powerful reliances for vindicating every right given by the Constitu-
tion, the laws and treaties of the United States.” Id. at 643 (quoting FELIX FRANKFURTER & 
JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 65 (1927)). 
16  Id. at 645 (quoting FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 15, at 65 n.34). 
17  See Resnik, supra note 14, at 958. 
18  Id. at 956 (citing Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Revision of List of Statutes 
Enlarging Federal Court Workload (Sept. 18, 1998) (memorandum) (on file with the Harvard 
Law School Library)). 
19  See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) and its progeny cases studied in 
every American civil procedure class. 
20  See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 103 (1987). 
21  See Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604 (1990). 
22  Thus, for example, one of the fundamental principles of personal jurisdiction in the Brus-
sels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters is the use of domiciliary nexus as the basis for assertion of jurisdiction. See Patrick J. 
Borchers, Comparing Personal Jurisdiction in the United States and the European Commu-
nity: Lessons for American Reform, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 121, 128 (1992). 
Summer 2015] MANNING THE COURTHOUSE GATES 1267 
stitute, rejected the expansive personal jurisdiction approach of the U.S. courts 
and adopted instead a requirement of “substantial contact” between the forum 
state and the party and/or the transaction or occurrence in dispute.23 Substantial 
connection was further defined to be where a substantial part of the event giv-
ing rise to the dispute occurred and/or where an individual defendant habitually 
resides, or where a jural defendant has received its charter of organization or 
has its principal place of business.24 These ALI/UNIDROIT Principles follow 
the rule of most other nations that required “substantial” contacts in a particular 
jurisdiction before the assertion of that court’s jurisdiction.25 For example, for 
cases before the European Court of Justice, personal jurisdiction over defend-
ants is based on domicile, or in a contract case, the place of performance; and 
in tort, the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur.26 Indeed, it is 
only in recent years that the U.S. Supreme Court has issued decisions that rein 
in and clarify the potentially expansive scope of personal jurisdiction, bringing 
it slightly more in line with the rest of the world.27 
Perhaps less known than the growth of jurisdiction is the physical estab-
lishment of courts abroad by the United States during periods of globalization 
and colonization. For example, around the turn of the century, the United States 
established in China the United States Court for China.28 Physically located in 
                                                        
23  See ALI/UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE 2.1.2 (2004), 
available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/civilprocedure/ali-unidroitprinci 
ples-e.pdf. 
24  See id. The American Law Institute, a prestigious organization of elected scholars, law-
yers, and judges, sponsors the drafting of model codes that governments of different coun-
tries might wish to adopt. More recently they have engaged scholars to draft model proce-
dural rules for international disputes, primarily meant to apply to “business disputes” and not 
tort actions. 
25  The Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters laid down 
rules governing the jurisdiction of courts and the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
in civil and commercial matters in all European Union countries. Council Regulation 
44/2001, 2000 O.J. (L 12) (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content 
/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32001R0044. 
26  Id. arts. 2, 5, 10. 
27  See, e.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011); Goodyear Dunlop 
Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011). In these decisions, the U.S. Su-
preme Court rejected broad applications by state courts of the “stream of commerce” theory 
of personal jurisdiction, which would subject manufacturers of goods to jurisdiction in any 
state where their goods are used or purchased. 
28  While not an Article III court, the U.S. Court for China had every appearance of any other 
federal court. Up until two days before its establishment, the court was referred to as the 
“U.S. District Court for China,” and the U.S. Court of Appeals referred to the jurisdiction of 
the U.S. Court for China as the “District of China.” For excellent studies of the U.S. Court 
for China, see Tahirih V. Lee, The United States Court for China: A Triumph of Local Law, 
52 BUFF. L. REV. 923 (2004) and TEEMU RUSKOLA, LEGAL ORIENTALISM: CHINA, THE 
UNITED STATES, AND MODERN LAW (2013). 
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the consular building in Shanghai,29 the U.S. Court for China based U.S. juris-
diction simply on the fact that the defendant in the dispute was an American 
citizen.30 Direct appeals of this court’s decisions went directly to the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals with further appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court.31 
Unabashedly, Congress aimed to create in the U.S. Court for China a vehi-
cle for promoting American interests abroad and to cure the corruption that had 
infested American consular officers in China.32 For thirty-seven years from its 
creation in 1906, to its dismantlement in 1943, the U.S. Court for China heard a 
wide variety of cases from debt to contracts to divorce.33 Its expansive jurisdic-
tion extends to any cases involving U.S. citizens and even U.S. non-citizen na-
tionals who originated from U.S. territories such as the Philippines and Guam.34 
Its stated goals were to provide a model of rule of law for the Chinese and to 
establish law and order for the American population in China. More accurately 
perhaps, in the words of veteran China lawyer Norman Allman, it was a con-
struction of an “America in China.”35 
Importantly, balanced against this generous grant of jurisdiction to the fed-
eral courts was the redistribution of power to party litigants through liberal 
pleadings and greater party autonomy as authorized by the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. As so carefully documented by Professor Steve Subrin, the 
drafters of the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were dominated by such 
thinkers as Roscoe Pound and Charles Clark whose expressed goals were to 
lower the barriers to the courthouse, to make filings easier and simpler, and to 
value equity over the rigidity of common law.36 Their idea was that the parties 
                                                        
29  Act of June 30, 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-403, 34 Stat. 814 (creating a United States Court for 
China and prescribing the jurisdiction thereof). For an excellent article discussing how the 
U.S. Court for China negotiated local law, see Lee, supra note 28. 
30  Act of June 30, 1906 § 4, 34 Stat. at 815. 
31  Id. § 3. 
32  See EILEEN P. SCULLY, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE FROM AFAR: AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 
IN TREATY PORT CHINA 1844–1942, at 105–06 (2001); see also Lee, supra note 28, at 940, 
957. 
33  The laws the court applied were a patchwork of federal legislation, common law, and 
statutes of Alaska and the District of Columbia as well as the municipal guidelines of the 
International Settlements in China and finally, at times, Chinese law with regards to real 
property. See Lee, supra note 28, at 1020–23, 1028. 
34  The Act of June 30, 1906 § 2, 34 Stat. at 815, provided that the jurisdiction of said court 
shall in all cases be exercised in conformity with treaties and laws of the United States then 
enforced. Extraterritorial jurisdiction in China was first granted to the United States by the 
Treaty of Wanghai in 1845 and followed by Treaty of Tiensin in 1860, giving the United 
States the right to try cases against its citizens in China. 
35  NORWOOD F. ALLMAN, SHANGHAI LAWYER 83–97 (1943). See generally LEGAL 
BORDERLANDS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN BORDERS (Mary L. Dudziak & 
Leti Volpp eds., 2006). 
36  Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987). 
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to a lawsuit must control the litigation and have reasoned participation in it.37 
The expansion of federal court authority was thus matched by the ability of pri-
vate citizens to use the courts. 
And so, the concept of a simple “notice” pleading served as the standard 
for the American complaint and answer since the enactment of the Federal 
Rules.38 Rule 8’s simple requirement that the pleader make “a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” meant that 
all but the most vexatious and empty complaints got a day in court.39 A com-
plaint needed to do little more than give the defendant notice of the nature of 
the claim against him or her. On the few occasions when the drafters thought it 
would help to have more specificity in the pleadings, they so stated, as in Rule 
9’s requirement for greater specificity in cases of fraud or mistake.40 Otherwise, 
the “notice” pleading standard allowed all but the most frivolous cases to be 
filed and heard in court. 
The general concept was that a pleading was not the appropriate battle-
ground for ferreting out the details and merits of a case. As noted by Charles 
Clark, the principal drafter of the federal rules, 
I think you will see at once these pleadings follow a general philosophy which is 
that detail, fine detail, in statement is not required and is in general not very 
helpful. . . . [I]f any of you feel you need more information to develop your case, 
if you need more information from your opponent, we have provided for that . . . 
in the section on Deposition and Discovery.41 
Pleadings should ordinarily not serve as a means of disposing of cases “un-
less it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in sup-
port of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”42 Rather, it was expected 
that discovery and other pretrial procedures would flesh out both claims and 
defenses and identify the disputed facts.43 For Clark, the 1938 Federal Rules 
were designed to enable judges to forge law in new fields but with the aid of 
creative lawyers and private citizens who would bring to the courts complex 
                                                        
37  Party-controlled litigation is the foundational characteristic of the adversary system. See 
SUBRIN & WOO, supra note 5, at 22; see also Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS 
ON AMERICAN LAW 34, 45 (Harold J. Berman ed., rev. ed. 1971). 
38  5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE CIVIL 
§ 1201 (3d ed. 2015). 
39  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
40  For example, Rule 9(b) states: “In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with par-
ticularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” In other words, with the excep-
tion of fraud or mistake and a few other exceptions, the norm under the federal rules is that 
averments do not have to be stated with particularity. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
41  SUBRIN & WOO, supra note 5, at 103 (first and second alterations in original) (quoting 
Charles E. Clark, Comments, Proceeding of the Institute at Washington, D.C. on the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure 33–44 (American Bar Association 1938)). 
42  Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957). 
43  Id. at 47–48. 
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cases for resolution.44 The preference was to open the courthouse gates and 
render access to justice easy for ordinary citizens. 
In the United States, liberal pleading requirements were maintained be-
cause of the belief in a procedural system in which “the preferred disposition is 
on the merits, by jury trial, after full disclosure through discovery.”45 Notice 
pleading was premised on the philosophy that pleading requirements should act 
as guides, not barriers, to the court system. Pleadings were not expected to fur-
ther the development of the case any more than merely giving general notice to 
the defendant of the nature of the suit against her.46 
In the United States then, the gatekeeping mechanism to weed out frivolous 
claims was relegated to a point in time later in the litigation when litigants used 
discovery to unearth the evidence. Except in the most egregious cases that did 
not survive a motion to dismiss, a judge’s dispositive role did not enter the pic-
ture until both parties had had a chance to pursue their version of events beyond 
the pleadings phase.47 The result was that, in the American system, judges had 
little presence in the lawsuit until well after litigation had begun. With the em-
phasis on the pre-trial stages of investigation and discovery, it was the lawyers 
and clients, and not judges, who controlled the pace and tenor of litigation. 
Liberal pleadings balanced the power of private litigants against the broad 
jurisdiction and powers of federal courts to satisfy democratic concerns about 
participation and fears of abuse of government authority. Liberal pleading gave 
private litigants great access to the courts to seek enforcement of legal norms 
and to rein in unbridled state powers. Broad discovery gave power to the ordi-
nary litigant to shape, develop, and prove his case. It was this combination of 
broad jurisdictional authority for the courts, liberal pleadings, and broad dis-
covery for litigants that transformed the U.S. federal courts into a site for social 
norm contentions and federal judges into adjudicators “rendering justice,”48 ra-
ther than simply gatekeepers. It was also this delicate balance that helped to 
shape the country’s national identity as a powerful central government within a 
democratic polity. 
                                                        
44  Subrin, supra note 36, at 973–74; see also Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act 
of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982). 
45  Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 439 (1986) (citing Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Jus-
tice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297, 318–19 (1938)). 
46  See Conley, 355 U.S. at 47–48. 
47  Estimates of the percentage of cases decided during the pleadings phase in the 1990s 
ranged from 2 percent to 6 percent of all federal civil cases. For information about the theory 
of modern pleading, see CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 456, 467–68 
(5th ed. 1994). 
48  An example is the work and activism of federal judge Jack Weinstein. See JEFFREY B. 
MORRIS, LEADERSHIP ON THE FEDERAL BENCH: THE CRAFT AND ACTIVISM OF JACK 
WEINSTEIN (2011). 
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B. Courts and the Market Economy in China 
A similar (but also contrasting) story may be told of civil procedure and 
law reforms in post-Mao China. Indeed, law and procedure were featured in 
every stage of China’s transition from a planned to market economy. Civil pro-
cedure remains part and parcel of China’s state building, containing within each 
new version provisions that reflect national goals and reforms. 
The idea that law and procedure could ensure stability and predictability 
necessary for a market economy compelled the reinstitution of legal institutions 
and procedures that were dismantled in China during the decade of the Cultural 
Revolution.49 This first wave of nation-building efforts for the post-Mao regime 
had the stated goal of opening up to the west and resuscitating its struggling 
economy. The result was the dramatic growth of the Chinese economy to its 
present day global dominance. 
Western observers, however, had higher hopes for law and, more specifi-
cally, equated law and the rule of law with democracy.50 Western reformers 
hoped that a free market economy and predictable legal institutions would lead 
to a democratization and liberalization of the Party regime.51 The Chinese state, 
however, had different goals. Law was instrumental in encouraging economic 
growth, and economic growth and rising living standards were in turn neces-
sary to sustain the legitimacy of the nation state, which, in China, meant the 
continuing dominance of the Chinese Communist Party state.52 
Indeed, China’s approach to development has consistently entailed strong 
state involvement in “guiding,” if not directing, the process. The visible hand of 
the government and hence, the Chinese Communist Party, has been more im-
portant than the invisible hand of the markets. Rejecting the “big bang” ap-
proach to market transformation,53 China kept top-down control to initially 
loosen limited private economic activities to take place in the countryside, then 
allowed private and foreign enterprises to operate “outside the plan,” before 
                                                        
49  For a nice summary of the legislation enacted to promote China’s market economy, see 
Donald C. Clarke, Legislating for a Market Economy in China, 191 CHINA Q. 567 (2007). 
50  See, e.g., Larry Diamond, The Coming Wave, J. DEMOCRACY, Jan. 2012, at 5, and the 
work of the other scholars contained in that volume, including Francis Fukuyama and Minxin 
Pei. 
51  See SAMANTHA F. RAVICH, MARKETIZATION AND DEMOCRACY: EAST ASIAN EXPERIENCES 
(2000); Larry Diamond, Why East Asia—Including China—Will Turn Democratic Within a 
Generation, ATLANTIC (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive 
/2012/01/a/251824/. For a contrary prediction, see AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: HOW 
EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY 
(2003) and Jonathan Perraton, Joseph Stiglitz’s, Globalization and Its Discontents, 16 J. 
INT’L DEV. 897 (2004). 
52  Minxin Pei, Is CCP Rule Fragile or Resilient?, J. DEMOCRACY, Jan. 2012, at 27. 
53  The “big bang” approach is generally associated with the transitional experiences of Po-
land and Russia in which economic reforms were rapidly installed through drastic price de-
control and privatization of state-owned properties. See Jeffrey D. Sachs, Privatization in 
Russia: Some Lessons from Eastern Europe, AM. ECON. REV., May 1992, at 43; see also 
JEFFREY SACHS, POLAND’S JUMP TO THE MARKET ECONOMY (1993). 
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tackling the dismantling of state-owned enterprises.54 The government used se-
quenced pressure upon those enterprises to change their operating procedures 
without initially facing full market exposure, not to mention privatization.55 
Even today, China’s economy, while predominantly organized by markets ra-
ther than by central bureaucratic planning, is still subject to substantial state 
guidance, subsidy, and involvement.56 And so, while China has enacted a new 
Property Law that, for the first time, theoretically protects private property 
rights,57 there remain major realms in which key features of capitalism are 
missing. Thus, for example, rights to land are still limited to long-term leases 
for the use of land, rather than full ownership, and global companies in major 
sectors such as energy and finance remain primarily state owned (controlled).58 
At every stage, Chinese legal reforms matched steps in the country’s eco-
nomic conditions. Law was used to sustain the market economy; the market 
economy led to economic prosperity; and economic prosperity bolstered the 
reigning authoritarian regime.59 China can be said to exemplify the new notion 
of an “Asian development or regulatory state,” characterized by a powerful 
                                                        
54  For comprehensive readings on China’s economic reforms, see BARRY NAUGHTON, THE 
CHINESE ECONOMY: TRANSITIONS AND GROWTH (2007); GROWTH WITHOUT MIRACLES: 
READINGS ON THE CHINESE ECONOMY IN THE ERA OF REFORM (Ross Garnaut &Yiping Huang 
eds., 2001). 
55  See Thomas G. Rawski, Implications of China’s Reform Experience, 144 CHINA Q. 1150 
(1995); Yingyi Qian & Chenggang Xu, Why China’s Economic Reforms Differ: The M-
Form Hierarchy and Entry/Expansion of the Non-State Sector, 1 ECON. TRANSITION 135 
(1993). 
56  The Chinese government’s continued involvement in its economy has led some to argue 
against granting China “market economy treatment” at the World Trade Organization. In 
particular, critics point to state subsidies that lower domestic costs artificially, and domestic 
prices directed by government agencies and policies, a finding that is supposed to expire fif-
teen years from the date China joined the WTO. See Matthew Dalton, Malmstrom: No Au-
tomatic Market Economy Status for China in 2016, WALL ST. J., REAL TIME BRUSSELS (Dec. 
11, 2014, 11:14 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2014/12/11/malmstrom-no-automatic-
market-economy-status-for-china-in-2016/. 
57  Joseph Kahn, China Approves Law That Protects Private Property, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/16/world/asia/16iht-web-0315china.4927191.html. 
58  Land continues to be owned by the state and purchasers trade only in the rights to use the 
land for a term up to seventy years. What happens to the buildings on the land after seventy 
years is still unclear. Are the land-use rights automatically renewed/extended for several 
decades, or must a land transfer fee based on the land prices of the time be paid, or what will 
happen? 
59  This source of non-democratic legitimacy can be termed performance legitimacy, mean-
ing that the government’s first priority should be the material wellbeing of the people. This 
idea has long roots in China, and the Chinese Communist Party derives much, if not most, of 
its legitimacy from its ability to provide for the material welfare of its citizens. Recent stud-
ies, however, found that while performance is the strongest element, political trust is becom-
ing more moderate, suggesting the growing importance of political relative to economic per-
formance. Neil M.I. Munro et al., Does China’s Regime Enjoy ‘Performance Legitimacy’? 
An Empirical Analysis Based on Three Surveys from the Past Decade (Aug. 19, 2013) (un-
published paper presented at Am. Political Sci. Ass’n 2013 Annual Meeting), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2302982. 
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state apparatus directing and overseeing long-term economic planning.60 In this 
sense, China challenges the neoliberal economic prescriptions and the arguable 
resultant liberal legalism that is favored by the United States and global institu-
tions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.61 Despite 
the successful economic growth and the enactment of numerous formal laws, 
neither the courts nor the judiciary in China can be said to be autonomous or 
independent from the party state. 
Structurally, today’s Chinese legal system is based on a civil law model 
and the inquisitorial system, borrowed from the German system.62 Internally, 
however, China’s courts retain aspects of its centuries-long tradition as a bu-
reaucratic empire bolstered by a modern socialist legality.63 Compared to U.S. 
courts, Chinese courts have limited authority, and, according to many observ-
ers, judges who are more bureaucratic actors (much like a civil servant) within 
a tightly party-controlled hierarchy than independent adjudicators. This treat-
ment of the judiciary as a bureaucracy rather than as an independent institution 
is not only consistent with China’s socialist dictates but also with its historical 
tradition of developing a centralized bureaucracy to govern its homogenous 
population.64 
Law continues to be a key instrument for each new phase of China’s eco-
nomic development, with legal reforms developing as “socialist rule of law 
with Chinese characteristics.”65 Two key moments marked China’s transition 
                                                        
60  See ALICE H. AMSDEN, THE RISE OF “THE REST”: CHALLENGES TO THE WEST FROM LATE-
INDUSTRIALIZING ECONOMIES (2001). Japan and Korea are probably the best examples of 
Asia’s distinctive state-led development. See Mark Beeson, Developmental States in East 
Asia: A Comparison of the Japanese and Chinese Experiences, ASIAN PERSP., vol. 33, no. 2, 
2009, at 5. 
61  See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1996: FROM PLAN TO MARKET 87–97 
(1996); ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, LAW AND POLICY REFORM AT THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT 
BANK (2001). For a good critique of some of the aid programs in the United States, see 
THOMAS CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD: THE LEARNING CURVE (1999). 
62  See Margaret Y.K. Woo, Justice, in HANDBOOK ON CHINA’S GOVERNANCE AND DOMESTIC 
POLITICS 53–66 (Chris Ogden ed., 2013). 
63  See generally STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER 
MAO (1999); CHINESE JUSTICE: CIVIL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA (Mar-
garet Y.K. Woo & Mary E. Gallagher eds., 2011). 
64  Francis Fukuyama, The Patterns of History, J. DEMOCRACY, Jan. 2012, at 14. 
65  The most recent declaration of support for “socialist rule of law with Chinese characteris-
tics” is the Decision Concerning Comprehensively Promoting Governing the Country Ac-
cording to Law issued by the 4th Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party on October 23, 2014. See Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Quanmian Tui-
jin Yifa Zhiguo Ruogan Zhongda Wenti de Jueding (୰ඹ୰ኸයன඲㠃᥎徃౫ἲ἞ᅜⱝᖸ㔜኱
斖桀ⓗ෩ᐃ) [Decision Concerning Comprehensively Promoting Governing the  
Country According to Law], PEOPLE.CN (Oct. 29, 2014), 
http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/1029/c1001-25926893.html. A translation of the deci-
sion can be found at CCP Central Committee Decision Concerning Some Major Questions 
in Comprehensively Moving Governing the Country According to the Law Forward, CHINA 
COPYRIGHT & MEDIA (Oct. 30, 2014), https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com 
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from a planned to market economy—the 1978 Plenum of the Chinese Com-
munist Party and then-Premier Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour in 1992. Chi-
nese court reform and civil procedure rule amendments followed each of these 
events, with a third cycle commencing in the last few years as the latest reitera-
tion of civil justice reforms in China.66 
More specifically, a national civil justice conference was also held in 1978 
and 1979, after the launch of Deng’s economic reforms. Jiang Hua, then-
President of the Supreme People’s Court (“SPC”), spoke of the necessity and 
legitimacy of civil justice to China’s development.67 After the conference, Chi-
nese legal reformers enhanced their efforts at procedural and institutional 
change. The SPC decreed that Chinese courts should “further improve the work 
of trying civil cases, protect the civil rights and interests of citizens and legal 
persons according to the law, and promote the just, safe, civilized, and healthy 
development of society.”68 
One of the first codes promulgated along with economic reforms was the 
Chinese Civil Procedure Code enacted first for trial implementation in 1982 
and then formally in 1991.69 While it is generally said that China prefers infor-
                                                                                                                                
/2014/10/28/ccp-central-committee-decision-concerning-some-major-questions-in-compre 
hensively-moving-governing-the-country-according-to-the-law-forward/. 
66  Another way of marking Chinese court reforms is by the promulgation of Supreme Peo-
ple’s Court’s Five Year Court Reform Plans beginning in 1999: Outline of the Court’s Five 
Year Program for Reform of the People’s Courts, Reform Plan I (1999–2003), Reform Plan 
II (2004–2008), Reform Plan III (2009–2013), and Reform Plan IV (2014–2018). See 
Renmin Fayuan Wu Nian Gaige Gangyao (ேẸἲ㝔஬ᖺᨵ㠉乚せ) [Five-Year Program for 
Reform of the People’s Courts] (1999) [hereinafter First Five-Year Court Reform Program], 
available at http://law.chinalawinfo.com/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=chl&Gid=23701; Renmin 
Fayuan di Er ge Wu Nian Gaige Gangyao (ேẸἲ㝔➨஧୭஬ᖺᨵ㠉乚せ) [Second Five-Year 
Program for Reform of the People’s Courts] (2005), available at 
http://law.chinalawinfo.com/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=chl&Gid=66296; Renmin Fayuan di 
San ge Wu Nian Gaige Gangyao 2009–2013 (ேẸἲ㝔➨୕୭஬ᖺᨵ㠉乚せ 2009–2013) 
[Third Five-Year Program for Reform of the People’s Courts 2009–2013] (2009), available 
at http://law.chinalawinfo.com/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=chl&Gid=114912; Renmin Fayuan di 
Si ge Wu Nian Gaige Gangyao 2014–2018 (ேẸἲ㝔➨ᅄ୭஬ᖺᨵ㠉乚せ 2014–2018) 
[Fourth Five-Year Program for Reform of the People’s Courts 2014–2018] (2015)  
[hereinafter Fourth Five-Year Court Reform Program], available at 
http://law.chinalawinfo.com/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=chl&Gid=243720. 
67  See Minshi Shenpan Gongzuo Tongdeng Zhongyao (Ẹ஦⭉ุᕤసྠ➼㔜せ) [Civil Trial Is 
Equally Important], available at http://www.geilibook.com/book/2441/157831.html and 
http://www.geilibook.com/book/2441/157832.html. 
68  Id., translated in Margaret Y.K. Woo, Contesting Citizenship: Marriage and Divorce in 
the People’s Republic of China, in SEX AND SEXUALITY IN CHINA 62, 75 (Elaine Jeffreys ed., 
2006). 
69  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minshi Susong Fa (୰⋶ேẸඹ࿴ᅜẸ஦孱孤ἲ) [Civil Pro-
cedure Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Apr. 9, 1991, effective Apr. 9, 1991) [hereinafter China Civ. P. Law of 
1991], translation available at http://www.china.org.cn/english/government/207339.htm. 
The 1991 Civil Procedure Law was amended in 2007, and again in 2012. See Quanguo 
Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Guanyu Xiugai “Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Minshi Susong Fa” de Jueding (඲ᅜேẸ௦⾲኱఍ᖖ≉ጤ␀఍යனಟᨵࠓ୰⋶ேẸ
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mality over formal legal process and values substantive over procedural jus-
tice,70 China nevertheless recognized the need to establish some procedural 
structure to ensure stability and predictability. As will be discussed below, 
these procedural rules were often structured even more to support China’s na-
tional goals of development and later, harmony. 
Under the 1991 Chinese Civil Procedure Law, territorial jurisdiction was 
limited to the defendant’s domicile or residence, where the tort was committed, 
or where the contract was to be performed.71 As for the complaint’s require-
ments, Article 110 specified that a claim must state the name and address of 
parties, the claim, and the facts on which it was based.72 Nevertheless, the Chi-
nese judge retained tremendous discretion in determining whether or not to ac-
cept a case. 
Historically, as in the inquisitorial and civil law tradition, the Chinese civil 
procedure code placed primary responsibility on judges to conduct investiga-
tion, which included the duty to review complaints for conformity before the 
case could proceed.73 And so, while complaints must follow a set form as pre-
scribed by Article 110, the complaint was also expected to include any evi-
dence, an identification of the sources of the evidence, and the names and ad-
dresses of witnesses.74 The court could then assess, perhaps even shape. the 
complaint at the filing stage to ensure that foundational evidentiary support was 
met for each claim, and docket it or reject it within seven days.75 
If the complaint were accepted, a chief judge or associate chief judge 
would sign to confirm case acceptance and issue a Notice of Case Acceptance 
                                                                                                                                
ඹ࿴ᅜẸ஦孱孤ἲࠔⓗ෩ᐃ) [Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress on Amending the “Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China”], 
available at http://law.chinalawinfo.com/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=chl&Gid=98762. 
70  See, e.g., SHAO-CHUAN LENG & HUNGDAH CHIU, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN POST-MAO CHINA 
(1985) (positing Chinese culture as preferring informality over formality, duty over rights, 
and the collective over the individual). 
71  China Civ. P. Law of 1991, supra note 69, arts. 22, 24, 29. 
72  Article 110 of the 1991 Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China states: 
A statement of complaint shall clearly set forth the following: (1) the name, sex, age, eth-
nic status, occupation, work unit and home address of the parties to the case; . . . (2) the claim or 
claims of the suit, the facts and grounds on which the suit is based; and (3) the evidence and its 
source, as well as the names and home addresses of the witnesses. 
China Civ. P. Law of 1991, supra note 69, art. 110. 
73  In Germany, the sense of social duty has led to reliance of the judge in shaping com-
plaints. Pleading requirements thus reflect the power dynamics between judge, litigant and 
lawyer, and the differences in the relationship between citizens and the state. See Peter 
Gottwald, Civil Justice Reform: Access, Cost, and Expedition. The German Perspective, in 
CIVIL JUSTICE IN CRISIS: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 207 (Adrian A.S. 
Zuckerman ed., 1999). 
74  China Civ. P. Law of 1991, supra note 69, art. 110. 
75  Id. art. 112. 
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to be sent to the parties.76 If rejected, the court was expected to issue a ruling 
containing an explanation of the reason for the refusal, and its ruling could be 
appealed.77 Once accepted, the complaint and accompanying evidences would 
be forwarded to the head of the adjudication tribunal, who would then desig-
nate a lead judge, secretary, and if a collegial panel, other members of the panel 
that would hear the case. Traditionally, the lead judge was responsible for the 
delivery of complaints and additional investigation of the case, and any sub-
stantial and procedural matter that may arise in the case. 
The Chinese judges’ responsibility to assess the case at the complaint stage 
could be said to be part and parcel of the inquisitorial system’s traditional focus 
on judicial control rather than on control by the parties as in the adversary sys-
tem. It is further bolstered by the Chinese socialist principle under which a 
judge is obligated “to seek truth from facts, and correct error whenever discov-
ered.”78 It is based on belief in an objective truth rather than a legal truth and 
that the litigation should end with a determination of who was truly at fault ra-
ther than who had proven their case.79 Under this approach, the court is respon-
sible for collecting, investigating, and confirming the evidence to unearth the 
truth. It then rests on the court to investigate, shape, and control the course of 
the litigation. 
The establishment of this complaint system marked the first stage in post-
Mao legal development. The early 1990s marked another spurt of economic 
development, beginning with the Resolution on Marketization of the Fourteenth 
National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.80 Then-Premier Deng 
Xiaoping, in the wake of a “southern tour” during which he saw the residual 
poverty that existed in rural areas of China, determined that further acceleration 
of market reforms was necessary.81 During this second stage of economic de-
                                                        
76  Wang Yaxin & Fu Yulin, China: Mainland. Efficiency at the Expense of Quality?, in 
CIVIL LITIGATION IN CHINA AND EUROPE: ESSAYS ON THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE AND THE 
PARTIES 11, 14 (C.H. (Remco) van Rhee & Fu Yulin eds., 2014). 
77  China Civ. P. Law of 1991, supra note 69, art. 112. 
78  “Seeking Truth from Facts” is a key element of Maoism, first quoted by Mao Zedong and 
later promoted by Deng Xiaoping as a central ideology of socialism with Chinese character-
istics. This goal is codified in China Civ. P. Law of 1991, supra note 69, arts. 2, 7. 
79  China Civ. P. Law of 1991, supra note 69, art. 2; see also Zhong Jianhua & Yu 
Guanghua, Establishing the Truth on Facts: Has the Chinese Civil Process Achieved This 
Goal?, 13 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & P. 393, 400–01 (2004). 
80  Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Jianli Shehui Zhuyi Shichang Jingji Tizhi Ruogan  
Wenti de Jueding (୰ඹ୰ኸයனᘓ❧♫఍୺ᷱᕷ⛢乷㳶యไⱝᖸ斖桀ⓗ෩ᐃ) [National  
Congress of the Chinese Communist Party Resolution on Establishment of a  
Socialist Market Economic System] (Nov. 14, 1993), available at 
http://law.chinalawinfo.com/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=chl&Gid=7590. 
81  See JIANG ZEMIN (Ụ㲥Ẹ), Jiakuai Gaige Kaifang He Xiandaihua Jianshe Bufa Duoqu 
You Zhong Guo Tese Shehui Zhuyi Shiye de Geng Da Shengli (ຍᛌᨵ㠉ᘙᨺ࿴䍘௦໬ᘓ学!
ṉఆ⣢ྲྀ᭷୰ᅜ≉Ⰽ♫఍୺ᷱ஦᷂ⓗ᭦኱傄฼) [ACCELERATING THE REFORM, THE OPENING TO 
THE OUTSIDE WORLD AND THE DRIVE FOR MODERNIZATION, SO AS TO ACHIEVE GREATER 
SUCCESSES IN BUILDING SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS] (1992), translation 
available at http://www.bjreview.com.cn/document/txt/2011-03/29/content_363504.htm. 
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velopment, China deepened market reforms and also encouraged the use of the 
courts. By now, not only was law important for economic development, but it 
was also needed to deal with the increased corruption and “local protectionism” 
of provincial governments.82 The central government in Beijing hoped that 
courts, prompted by disgruntled litigants challenging governmental actions, 
could assist in reining in local bureaucrats and help to increase development.83 
During this period, Chinese reformers experimented with the adversary 
system and acted to promote limited judicial independence. Chinese reformers 
wavered between promoting judges as adjudicatory officers and relying on 
them as bureaucratic actors; between giving greater power to litigants to shape 
their litigation and placing that responsibility primarily on judges. In 1997, the 
Chinese Communist Party at its Fifteenth National Congress reiterated what 
was to be the first ten-year target for national economic and social development 
with a basic strategy of “managing state affairs according to law” and 
“build[ing] a socialist country ruled by law.”84 In the area of civil procedure, 
this meant that it was the litigants who must bear the burdens of pleading and 
proof.85 No longer was legal informality tolerated as China proclaimed itself as 
“a country ruled by law,”86 and it rested on litigants to prove their cases. 
In June 1998, the SPC promulgated the Several Rules on Civil and Eco-
nomic Trials, which placed burdens of providing proof on the parties rather 
than on judicial investigation and allowed for limited discovery. The SPC also 
set a goal of establishing an open and public trial system in an effort to legiti-
mize the work of the courts through increasing transparency. These reforms 
were bolstered by the Court’s Five Year Reform Program (1999–2003), which 
placed emphasis on improvement of the court process and the judiciary as in, 
                                                        
82  Thus, the First Five Year Court Reform Plan targeted local protectionism as one danger to 
“socialist rule of law.” First Five-Year Court Reform Program, supra note 66. 
83  Ren Jianxin (௵ᘓ᪂), Supreme People’s Court President, Address Before the Fourth Ses-
sion of the Eighth National People’s Congress: Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongzuo Baogao 
1996 Nian (᭱㧗ேẸἲ㝔ᕤస㉍࿌1996ᖺ) [Supreme People’s Court Work Report, 1996] 
(Mar. 12 1996), available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2000-12/07 
/content_5003526.htm. 
84  See JIANG ZEMIN (Ụ㲥Ẹ), GAOJU DENG XIAOPING LILUN WEIDA QIZHI, BA JIANSHE YOU 
ZHONGGUO TESE SHEHUI ZHUYI SHIYE QUANMIAN TUIXIANG ERSHIYI SHIJI (㧗ᷦ总ᑠᖹ⌮孢!
ệ኱᪝ⷄ㸪ᢕᘓ学᭷୰ᅜ≉Ⰽ♫఍୺ᷱ஦᷂඲㠃᥎ྥ஧༑୍ୡ乒) [HOLD HIGH THE GREAT 
BANNER OF DENG XIAOPING THEORY, ADVANCEMENT OF THE CAUSE OF BUILDING SOCIALISM 
WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS’ INTO THE 21ST CENTURY] (1997), translation available at 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/45607.htm. 
85  See Guanyu Minshi Jingji Shenpan Fangshi Gaige Wenti de Ruogan Guiding (යனẸ஦
乷㳶⭉ุ᪉ᘧᨵ㠉斖桀ⓗⱝᖸ奬ᐃ) [Several Rules on the Reform of Civil and Economic Tri-
als] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct. Judicial Comm., July 11, 1998) (clarifying par-
ties’ burdens of proof, the trial function, and the judicial panel’s responsibilities), available 
at http://law.chinalawinfo.com/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=chl&Gid=20233; see also Jiang Wei 
(Ụệ) & Wu Zeyong (ྻ㲥ຬ), Zhengju Fa Ruogan Jiben Wenti de Fazhexue Fengxi (孩ᤣἲ
ⱝᖸᇶᮏ斖桀ⓗἲဴᏛศᯒ) [A Jurisprudential Analysis on Several Basic Issues of Evidential 
Law], 2 ZHONGGUO FAXUE (୰ᅜἲᏛ) [CHINESE JURISPRUDENCE] 24, 45–46 (2002). 
86  See Jiang Wei & Wu Zeyong, supra note 85. 
1278 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:1261 
for example, establishing a National Judicial Exam and heightened qualifica-
tions for judicial officers.87 
But, it turned out that the efforts to establish greater legal formality and 
placing burdens of proof for the parties only added greater barriers to justice, 
absent adequate legal assistance. The number of Chinese lawyers, then and 
now, remains small relative to the population, and most Chinese lawyers gravi-
tate towards the urban rather than rural areas.88 Where previously lawyers had 
been state cadres employed by the government, the new private lawyers, then 
and now, steered towards the more profitable practice of corporate and business 
law.89 In some rural areas, lawyers and even judges who are legally trained re-
main rare. The effect was that the Chinese legal market increased the disparity 
between rich and poor in terms of access to justice.90 
Added to this picture was the increasing number of disputes that naturally 
occurred with economic development. Faced with increased workload as well 
as professional incentives, many Chinese judges retreated behind a veil of legal 
technicality.91 Rather than face reversals that could result in lower pay and di-
minished promotion prospects, Chinese judges preferred to have cases go away 
rather than adjudicate them.92 Burdened with the obligation to assess the com-
plaint at an initial stage, but relieved of the obligation to investigate, Chinese 
judges retained great discretion in accepting or not accepting cases and pre-
ferred to deny acceptance of troublesome or political sensitive cases, often 
without offering litigants a chance to argue otherwise.93 
In 1998, in an effort to regularize the filing process, Xiao Yang, the then-
President of the Supreme People’s Court, ordered a separation of functions (fil-
ing, adjudicating, and supervising) and that every court establish a case filing 
division separate from the trial division.94 But the case filing division was to be 
staffed by judges, generally on a rotational basis, and retained substantial con-
trol in determining whether or not to accept a case. The case filing tribunal was 
responsible for the more routine tasks of examining and registering cases and 
appeals, delivering the complaint and other litigation documents, appointing a 
presiding or responsible judge and other members of a collegial panel, fixing 
                                                        
87  First Five-Year Court Reform Program, supra note 66. 
88  See generally Fu Yulin, Dispute Resolution and China’s Grassroots Legal Services, in 
CHINESE JUSTICE, supra note 63, at 314. 
89  Ethan Michelson, Lawyers, Political Embeddedness, and Institutional Continuity in Chi-
na’s Transition from Socialism, 113 AM. J. SOC. 352, 365, 371 (2007). 
90  Fu Yulin, supra note 88, at 314. 
91  See Sida Liu, With or Without the Law: The Changing Meaning of Ordinary Legal Work 
in China, 1979–2003, in CHINESE JUSTICE, supra note 63, at 234. 
92  See Carl Minzner, Judicial Disciplinary Systems for Incorrectly Decided Cases: The Im-
perial Chinese Heritage Lives On, in CHINESE JUSTICE, supra note 63, at 58. 
93  See Nanping Liu with Michelle Liu, Justice Without Judges: The Case Filing Division in 
the People’s Republic of China, 17 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 283, 284–65, 287–88 
(2011). 
94  See First Five-Year Court Reform Program, supra note 66. 
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the date of court sessions, issuing notices, and preserving property and evi-
dence before trial, but it also took on the more substantive tasks of mediating, 
handling objections to jurisdiction, and assessing the evidence submitted by the 
parties.95 The adjudication panel theoretically would not have access to a case 
file until the case was cleared by the case filing tribunal. 
The underlying purpose of this reform was to increase efficiency in sched-
uling a case for substantive hearing only when it was ready and to ensure great-
er impartiality of judges by isolating the trial judge from the case. But the con-
tinued control and discretion retained by the case filing division in reviewing 
and refusing to accept complaints was such that reformers urged the substitu-
tion of a registration system for complaints rather than a filing system that al-
lowed for substantive reviews.96 Notably, this registration system was not fully 
adopted until 2015. 
As the reality of greater legal formality without greater legal representation 
led to greater dissatisfaction with the Chinese courts, litigants flocked to file 
letters and petitions of appeal to governmental agencies, and sometimes, to the 
streets.97 Concerned with threats of social instability because courts were not 
able to “end the disputes,” the Chinese government launched the next set of 
policy and reforms. This time, the emphasis was on preserving social harmo-
ny.98 Rather than increasing access to the courts, as discussed below, the latest 
set of Chinese legal reforms appeared to close the courthouse gates, even as 
judges were asked to multi-track litigation, to mediate cases, and to “end” dis-
putes, rather than adjudicate them, in an effort to preserve harmony.99 
                                                        
95  See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Renmin Fayuan Lian Gongzuo de Zhanxing Guiding 
(᭱㧗ேẸἲ㝔යனேẸἲ㝔❧᱌ᕤసⓗ㘪⾜奬ᐃ) [Interim Provisions of the Case Filing Divi-
sion of the Supreme People’s Court] (promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct., Apr. 21, 1997), 
available at http://law.chinalawinfo.com/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=chl&Gid=17120. 
96  A case registration system was established this year by the Supreme People’s Court. See 
Guanyu Renmin Fayuan Tuixing Lian Dengji Zhi Gaige de Yijian (යனேẸἲ㝔᥎⾜❧᱌
Ⓩ存ไᨵ㠉ⓗព奩) [Opinion on the Implementation of the People’s Courts Reform of the 
Case-filing Registration System] (promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct., Apr. 1, 2015,  
effective May 1, 2015) [hereinafter Case-Filing Registration System], available at 
http://law.chinalawinfo.com/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=chl&Gid=246925. 
97  Carl F. Minzner, Xinfang: An Alternative to Formal Chinese Legal Institutions, 42 STAN. 
J. INT’L L. 103, 103–05 (2006). 
98  See China Publishes ‘Harmonious Society’ Resolution, CHINA.ORG.CN (Oct. 19, 2006), 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/2006/Oct/184810.htm [hereinafter Harmonious Society 
Resolution]. 
99  See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Jinyibu Jiaqiang Sifa Jianyi Gongzuo Wei Goujian 
Shehui Zhuyi Hexie Shehui Tigong Sifa Fuwu de Tongzhi (᭱㧗ேẸἲ㝔යன徃୍ṉຍ笶ྖἲ
ᘓ孖ᕤసᷢᯊᘓ♫఍୺ᷱ࿴宸♫఍ᥦ౪ྖἲ᭹≉ⓗ㏻▱) [Opinion of the Supreme People’s 
Court, Regarding the Next Step Towards Litigation Development According to Socialist 
Principals and Harmonious Society] ¶ 2 (2007) [hereinafter Next Step], available at 
http://law.chinalawinfo.com/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=chl&Gid=91949. 
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II. CLOSING THE COURTHOUSE GATES 
Indeed, a comparative look at the latest trends in both countries reveals 
strategies with a similar result of closing the courthouse gates.100 Interestingly, 
however, both responses may undermine the raison d’être of the procedures be-
ing reformed. In the case of the United States, recent reforms in civil procedure 
to discourage litigation may have the effect of decreasing democracy. In the 
case of China, similar reforms to channel litigation away from the courts may 
have the effect of increasing disharmony. 
A. Changing U.S. Pleadings Standards 
As so accurately documented by scholars in this volume, including 
Subrin,101 Stephen Burbank and Sean Farhang,102 Jeffrey Stempel,103 and Linda 
Mullenix,104 civil justice reforms in the United States have meant changes in 
summary judgment standards, discovery rules, and greater case management, 
all of which have led to a problematic decrease in the trial rate in the United 
States. Scholars argue that this has resulted in a democratic crisis because, 
“[s]ince the founding of our country, trials in open court resulting in decisions 
by either a judge or a jury have been thought to be constitutive of American 
democracy.”105 The focus of these concerns is the absence of trials and deter-
                                                        
100  In Japan, the latest civil procedure code was adopted and became effective on January 1, 
1998. A main objective of the new code was the improvement of issue-identifying proce-
dures. These procedures included stricter pleadings requirements as well as an improved 
plenary hearing held quickly after the complaint to identify the real issues as early as possi-
ble. The reforms attempted to maintain respect for the parties’ intentions while expanding 
the courts’ powers. In Japan, the Japanese court has been given power to order a preparatory 
plenary hearing in order to identify and clarify the issues in the case. At this hearing, the 
Japanese court has the power to require presentation of evidence on matters of fact and law, 
and preliminary documents are formally exchanged. The judge may, prior to holding plenary 
hearings, assign the case for oral proceedings preparatory to plenary hearings or require 
preparation by written documents only. At the “preparatory proceedings” the judge records 
all the alleged facts, issues, and proposed evidence. After the preparatory proceeding, no fur-
ther allegations or evidence can be introduced except in limited situations. At this early 
meeting, settlement is attempted. If the case cannot be settled, then the conference concen-
trates on refining and focusing the issues so that the later plenary hearing (the main oral pro-
ceeding) will be more effective. Takeshi Kojima, Japanese Civil Procedure in Comparative 
Law Perspective, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 687, 691 (1998). 
101  Steve Subrin, Reflections, 15 NEV. L.J. 1689 (2015). 
102  Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Federal Court Rulemaking and Litigation Reform: 
An Institutional Approach, 15 NEV. L.J. 1559 (2015). 
103  Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Irrepressible Myth of Burnham and Its Increasing Indefensibil-
ity After Goodyear and Daimler, 15 NEV. L.J. 1203 (2015). 
104  Linda S. Mullenix, Reflections of a Recovering Aggregationist, 15 NEV. L.J. 1455 (2015). 
105  Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a Real-
istic Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 399, 400–01 (2011) (56 percent of all 
12(b)(6) motions were granted to dismiss complaints for insufficiency after Iqbal, with 60 
percent in constitutional civil rights cases, and a 60 percent decrease in cases going to trial 
over the past to 30 years ago). 
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minations by juries—symbols of participation and democracy. This era of dra-
matic decreases in trials is what Professors Subrin and Main called “the fourth 
era of civil procedure.”106 
While this “fourth era” is problematic in its decreased focus on trials, 
equally problematic is its focus on the process of disposing cases at the early 
stages of pre-filing and filing of complaints. While the trial event is important 
in ensuring transparency and publicity107 and its deprivation is cause for alarm, 
the deprivation of court access at the complaint stage is similarly—and maybe 
even more—critical. Closing the courthouse gate decreases democratic partici-
pation when litigants’ voices are filtered out of the court system from the start. 
Making initial judgments to turn away cases at the complaint stage deprives cit-
izens the opportunity to do the needed discovery under the procedural rules and 
undermine facts in the possession of opposing parties, and importantly, to par-
ticipate in defining how norms are to be applied. 
Indeed, varying Supreme Court doctrines in recent years have restricted 
access to courts.108 As of 2008, federal judges manage dockets of approximate-
ly three hundred cases per year, with less than 5 percent going to trial. The oth-
er 95 percent of disputes are diverted to mandatory arbitration, settlement con-
ferences with a magistrate judge or district judge who work to settle cases, 
summary bench trials, directed pre-trial verdicts, and dismissal of complaints 
for insufficiency or implausibility. Despite the seemingly benign focus on effi-
ciency and conserving judicial resources, scholars are finding that the increase 
in pre-trial dispositions with earlier and steeper procedural hurdles often results 
in negative consequences for plaintiffs. 
But to my mind, of all the procedural changes, the greatest concern is cre-
ated by judicial reforms at the front end, rather than the back (trial) end of the 
court process. There have been numerous procedural reforms, but none more 
problematic than narrowing pleading requirements.109 The reason is that plead-
ing rules distribute power between litigants and judges, individuals and the 
state. Pleading rules may vary depending upon the role civil litigation serves in 
a particular system at a particular juncture—be it private conflict resolution, so-
cial control, or democratic participation. In the United States, the liberal plead-
                                                        
106  Subrin & Main, supra note 6. 
107  See Judith Resnik, The Contingency of Openness in Courts: Changing the Experiences 
and Logics of the Public’s Role in Court-Based ADR, 15 NEV. L.J. 1631 (2015). 
108  See Helen Hershkoff et al., Joint Comments on Proposed Amendments to Federal  
Rules of Civil Procedure (Feb. 5, 2014), available at http://www.afj.org 
/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Professors-Joint-Comment.pdf; see also Elizabeth M. Schnei-
der, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil 
Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 518 (2010). 
109  In the procedure war, a focus on everything might mean a focus on nothing and a focus 
on pleadings is where we should concentrate our attention. While trials in the open are con-
stitutive of democracy (because of the participation of juries and the transparency they gen-
erate), I find equally important the participatory democracy generated by access to the courts 
and the deprivation of that participation by the “plausibility” pleadings requirement. 
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ings rules encompassed in the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure meant 
access to courts and an opportunity for ordinary citizens to participate in the 
application of top-down norms. In allowing the control of the lawsuit to rest 
with private litigants, liberal pleading is one way to balance against concentrat-
ed state power, even as the federal courts grew. 
By providing formal mechanisms and routes of redress, courts can protect 
individuals’ rights from arbitrary infringement and create a stable social order 
for democratic growth. Liberal pleading rules empower private citizens to in-
voke state mechanisms in their disputes, and also allow judges to block arbi-
trary assertions and denial of state powers and assistance. Admittedly, while 
stricter pleading rules can serve as a bulwark against anarchy by their limita-
tions on private parties,110 more liberal pleading rules represent greater trust of 
private litigants and invite their voices into the legal system. 
Yet, in recent years, the philosophy of allowing liberal pleadings has 
changed. Federal district courts have been told by the Supreme Court to be-
come more aggressive gatekeepers, clearing dockets without the opportunity 
for discovery or trials.111 While in the past, the gatekeeping function of district 
judges was limited to an initial determination of “jurisdiction, ripeness, moot-
ness, political questions, immunity, abstention,” and a determination of whether 
the complainant has articulated “any” grounds for relief, the Supreme Court has 
now turned district judges into gatekeepers, with heightened pleading standards 
in a variety of settings. The Supreme Court’s Iqbal, Twombly, and Dukes deci-
sions have dismissed cases with an early initial assessment of the “plausibility” 
of the plaintiff’s claims and requests for class certification.112 
This narrowing of the pleadings requirement is problematic not only be-
cause it can deprive private litigants of their rights of action, but also because 
as an institutional barrier, it closes off the courthouse gate at such an initial 
stage that it prevents participation, a component of democracy. While trials en-
sure greater transparency and publicity, complaints are the entry to the court-
house itself and denial means the denial of access to the entire court process. 
Unlike the “notice” pleadings standard, which was relatively clear in deeming 
all complaints sufficient so long as they provided notice to the defendant of the 
underlying disputes, the present new standard of “plausibility” is highly discre-
tionary and places broader authority and control in the hands of federal judges. 
The present pleading standard of “plausibility” gives judges greater discretion 
in deciding what goes in and what goes out, discretion that can be based on 
                                                        
110  See Richard L. Marcus, Reining in the American Litigator: The New Role of American 
Judges, 27 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 3, 10 (2003). 
111  See Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 
IOWA L. REV. 821, 823 (2010) (discussing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 
(2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, (2009)); see also Burbank & Subrin, supra 
note 105, at 400. 
112  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547 (2011); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662, 670 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). 
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judges’ personal conceptions of the plausibility of plaintiff’s version of the 
facts and, more problematically, can be tainted by judges’ political orientations 
and agendas. Rather than limiting the power of the judge, the new “plausibility” 
pleading standard expands the power of judges and takes away from the power 
of the litigant to have his case heard.113 
Given the context of broad federal court jurisdiction, empowering judges to 
assess the complaint under such a discretionary standard could mean greater 
state control in deciding what comes in and what stays out of court.114 As doc-
umented by Judith Resnik in her seminal article Trial as Error, the federal judi-
ciary developed as an institution with a judicial platform that promotes its im-
portance, and by lobbying Congress to broadly define its own role.115 It may be 
that federal courts are now seeking greater control of their docket by taking the 
authority to assess cases at the pleading stage through the more flexible plausi-
bility standard. 
And along with the changing pleadings standards, the role of federal judges 
has also changed.116 Rather than adjudicating issues based on the evidence pre-
sented by the parties, federal judges are now expected to be managers with an 
eye toward assessing rather than adjudicating disputes, and defining what con-
stitutes a cause of action without going through the legislative process. This is 
all done without giving litigants a chance to conduct discovery and unearth the 
evidence to sustain their complaints, and less time to argue their case before a 
judge. This decrease in face-time has led commentators, such as U.S. District 
Judge William Young, to bemoan the lack of interchange between judges and 
litigants and juries: 
More than two-thirds of the 94 federal district courts reported fewer hours in the 
courtroom in Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 than they did four years earlier. Total court-
room hours nationwide dropped more than 8 percent during that that same 
timeframe. Moreover, during that span, some district courts averaged fewer than 
                                                        
113  According to some observers, the “plausibility” standard casts the judge into the fact-
finding role of the civil jury. See Carrington, supra note 10, at 651. 
114  By contrast, both Germany and Austria focus on case management as their strategy for 
combating delays and inefficiencies. In both countries, a civil case starts with the filing of a 
lawsuit and an examination by the court as to whether all the procedural prerequisites are 
fulfilled. While the German model adheres to the motto ne eat iudex ultra petita partium (the 
parties control the subject matter) in civil proceedings, and a plaintiff must state specific re-
lief based on particular facts, and must disclose relevant facts, it is only at a later preparatory 
hearing in open court, at which the attorneys orally present their clients’ allegations, argu-
ments, and prayers for relief, that the court will review the complaint. But even in Germany, 
the trend has been towards greater judicial control and greater specificity. 
115  See Resnik, supra note 14, at 980, 995. 
116  For a succinct analysis of how the role of judging has changed in recent years, see Eliza-
beth M. Schneider, Jeffrey B. Morris, Leadership on the Federal Bench: The Craft and Ac-
tivism of Jack Weinstein, 64 J. LEGAL ED. 339 (2014) (book review). 
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200 total courtroom hours per judge per year, the equivalent of less than one 
hour per judge per day.117 
Rather than providing a public forum, courts are now resolving cases on 
paper and often outside the presence of litigants or jurors. 
Expanding jurisdiction and resting greater authority on judges to decide the 
sufficiency of a complaint foster top-heavy state control of litigation. Discre-
tion in retaining or rejecting the case lies largely with the court’s subjective 
sense of what is “plausible.” Of course, under the adversary system, the judge 
cannot sua sponte dismiss a claim, but the reality of the “plausibility” standard 
is that dismissal will depend on the judge’s discretion even before a plaintiff 
has a chance to develop his claim. While judges have a role in preventing pri-
vate parties from abusive use of court powers, that role arguably can be suffi-
ciently satisfied with better case management and enforcement of Rule 11 
mandates on responsible and ethical lawyering.118 Cutting off cases at the filing 
stage with such an indeterminate standard undermines the concept of civil liti-
gation as democratic. Ordinary citizens have less opportunity to bring to court 
cases that would invite debate and discussion of the application of disputed 
norms. 
B. Recent Chinese Procedural Reforms 
The Chinese story is slightly different and yet all too similar. While law 
may be used to promote “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” rather than 
democracy, recent changes to civil procedure in China also narrow entry to the 
courts and, in so doing, challenge the underlying goal of the system itself, with 
the most recent goal being to promote social harmony and stability. 
In the race to achieve global parity with other developed nations, China has 
also added to its great internal inequality.119 As the world’s second largest 
economy, China now has a Gini coefficient for income inequality of 42.1, an 
index that is higher than that of the United States at 40.8, but lower than the in-
dex for South Africa at 63.1.120 Vast gaps exist in China between the urban rich 
and the rural poor and between men and women workers. Home to one in five 
of the world’s women, China nevertheless ranked 69 of 135 countries in the 
Global Gender Gap Index 2012, below the United States at 22 but ahead of Ja-
pan at 101.121 
                                                        
117  Jordan M. Singer & William G. Young, Measuring Bench Presence: Federal District 
Judges in the Courtroom, 2008–2012, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 243, 247 (2013). 
118  See FED. R. CIV. P. 11, 16. 
119  Edward Wong, Survey in China Shows a Wide Gap in Income, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 
2013, at A9. 
120  See Income Gini Coefficient, U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORTS 
(2013), http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/income-gini-coefficient. 
121  WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, THE GLOBAL GENDER GAP REPORT 2014 54, 56 (2014), avail-
able at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GGGR14/GGGR_CompleteReport_2014.pdf. Chi-
na’s ranking dropped to 87 in 2014. Id. at 54. 
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With disparity has come greater unrest, as Chinese citizens have taken to 
the courts problems ranging from land confiscation to inadequate social securi-
ty to labor and employment disputes. From 1991 to 2010, the number of civil 
first instance cases accepted by the Chinese courts increased at an annual rate 
of more than 10 percent.122 Faced with rising caseload and more complex cases, 
overworked Chinese judges would sometimes avoid cases and fail to docket 
them at filing.123 When litigants fail to get satisfaction from the courts, they 
took to the streets and the number of protests increased.124 
To counter the greater discontent in the general population, then-President 
Hu Jintao and the CCP in 2006 formally endorsed a political doctrine that 
called for the creation of a “harmonious society” (héxié shèhuì).125 It is a policy 
that signals a movement away from sole reliance on economic reform to solve 
worsening social tensions and, to some critics, towards an avenue to maintain 
stability at all costs.126 Notably, the call for “socialist harmonious society” 
comes at a time when China is striving to achieve international prominence and 
state building.127 According to some, the call for harmony also reflects a return 
to traditional Confucian values and a national emphasis on “order over free-
dom, duties over rights, and group interests over individual ones.”128 
It is within this context of addressing problems of social instability, nation-
building, and public dissatisfaction with the work of the courts that recent civil 
justice reforms in China must be understood. As mentioned above, with grow-
ing social unrest and discontent, China saw an increase in letters of complaint, 
as well as rising numbers of petitions (a method of seeking review of cases af-
ter final appeals).129 Government officials attributed this rise in petitions to the 
courts’ inability to resolve disputes, as well as increased corruption and graft in 
the courts.130 Concerned that the courts were unable to contain social discord 
and fearing a loss of legitimacy for the party state, the Chinese government 
equated improved legal work with greater consideration of the social and polit-
ical context of cases and commenced another round of judicial reforms.131 
                                                        
122  Cai Yanmin, Case Management in China’s Civil Justice System, in CIVIL LITIGATION IN 
CHINA AND EUROPE, supra note 76, at 39, 40. 
123  Liu & Liu, supra note 93, at 317, 330. 
124  See O’Brien & Li, supra note 13, at 1–2. 
125  Harmonious Society Resolution, supra note 98. 
126  Maureen Fan, China’s Leadership Declares New Priority: ‘Harmonious Society’, WASH. 
POST, October 12, 2006, at A18. 
127  See Harmonious Society Resolution, supra note 98. 
128  See SHAO-CHUAN LENG & HUNGDAH CHIU, supra note 70, at 123. 
129  Minzner, supra note 97, at 104–05. 
130  Id. at 152. 
131  See China to Launch Education of “Socialist Concept of Rule of Law”, PEOPLE’S DAILY 
ONLINE (Apr. 14, 2006, 8:55 A.M.), http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200604/14 
/eng20060414_258297.html (stating socialist rule of law is the building of a socialist harmo-
nious society); see also Next Step, supra note 99. 
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Beginning in the mid-2000s, China initiated the first sets of major amend-
ments to the Chinese civil procedure code since its enactment.132 Amendments 
to the 1991 Civil Procedure Code were enacted in 2007 (effective in 2008) and 
but most comprehensively in 2011 (effective in 2012). Both sets of amend-
ments simultaneously empower and limit the courts. They empower the courts 
vis-à-vis the litigants but limit the court vis-à-vis the party state. They provide 
greater authority to courts to streamline cases but also ensure greater oversight 
of courts by other judicial institutions. 
The resultant procedural amendments retreat from the move toward an ad-
versarial process and return to an emphasis on judicial control of litigation and 
the encouragement of mediation. Under the call of “harmonious society,” the 
recent civil procedure amendments retain the judge’s discretion to not accept 
cases, reemphasize mediation over adjudication, and establish a multi-tracked 
case management system to divert cases.133 
Under these amendments, Chinese courts continue the rule that the judge 
must decide whether or not to accept the case within seven days.134 Article 108 
of the 2008 Amendments again requires that a complaint meet four condi-
tions—a qualified plaintiff; a definite defendant; specific claims, facts, and 
causes of action; and that the complaint fall within the scope of acceptance for 
civil actions by the people’s court and within the jurisdiction of the people’s 
court where the suit is filed.135 All four conditions, but in particular the condi-
tion requiring “specific claims, facts, and causes of action,” are left undefined, 
with interpretation resting in the discretion of the court. Since it is not obligato-
ry for defendants to file a statement of defense, the plaintiffs must satisfy the 
judge, rather than the defendant, that they have enough evidence to get the case 
docketed. Significantly, the rules do not provide an opportunity for the plaintiff 
to respond or argue his case. It is simply when the judge is satisfied with the 
complaint that the complaint is served on the defendant. Thereafter, the case 
filing division will also attempt to mediate the case.136 
                                                        
132  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guowuyuan Xinwen Bangongshi (୰⋶ேẸඹ࿴ᅜᅜ≉㝔
᪂斣≆බᐊ) [Information Office, State Council of the People’s Republic of China], 
Zhongguo de Sifa Gaige (୰ᅜⓗྖἲᨵ㠉) [China’s Judicial Reform] (White Paper, Oct. 9, 
2012), available at http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2012-10/09/content_2239771.htm, translation 
available at http://china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/2012-10/09/content_26733726.htm. 
133  Cai Yanmin, supra note 122, at 40–41, 45–46. 
134  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minshi Susong Fa (୰⋶ேẸඹ࿴ᅜẸ஦孱孤ἲ) [Civil 
Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 31, 2012, effective Jan. 1, 2013) [hereinafter Current China Civ. 
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cedure Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.  
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http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=19. 
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the writ and decides whether or not it will proceed with the claim. If the court decides to 
dismiss the claim, the plaintiff can appeal this decision. Stage 2: The court serves the writ on 
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Both because of the piling up of cases and limited judicial resources, the 
case filing division has the incentive to avoid controversial cases that will con-
sume a great deal of judicial time and energy. This discretion has led courts to 
deny acceptance to cases that they view as troublesome and politically sensi-
tive. Thus, for example, in 2009, concerns that cases brought against a compa-
ny for contaminated milk powder would result in further instability led courts 
to deny acceptance of such cases without explanation.137 Some courts, such as 
the Higher People’s Court of the Guanxi Autonomous Region, even issued di-
rectives stating that certain categories of cases (land and labor disputes) would 
not be accepted temporarily.138 At one point, even the Supreme People’s Court 
instructed lower courts not to accept certain civil cases, including those chal-
lenging controversial property confiscation and compensation.139 
In the latest round of amendments to the Civil Procedure Code in 2012,140 
Chinese scholars thus urged the establishment of a registration system to re-
place the present case filing system. A registration system would have the court 
check a filed complaint only for technical format rather than examine it for 
compliance with substantive requirements.141 The final 2012 Amendments, 
however, did not include the replacement of the case filing system with the reg-
istration system. It did, however, add a provision to new Article 123 which 
states that “The people’s court . . . must protect the parties’ legal right in bring-
ing litigation . . . [and] accept lawsuits filed in conformity [with these 
rules].”142 
                                                                                                                                
the defendant, and the defendant may defend within fifteen days after receipt of the writ. The 
defendant has a right of defense, which may be waived by the defendant. Stage 3 is the trial, 
including submissions by the parties, cross-examination and closing submissions. The court 
also attempts mediation. Stage 4: The court pronounces its judgment. All of this can be done 
within six months. See Wang Yaxin & Fu Yulin, supra note 76, at 13. 
137  See Xin Fei, Chinese Courts Delay Admission of Lawsuits Against Sanlu, EPOCH TIMES, 
(Nov. 4, 2008), http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/china-news/sanlu-melamine-china-law 
suits-6672.html. 
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Cases: the Provincial High Court Claims Social Conditions], SINA, (Aug, 24, 2004), 
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2004-08-24/14093481688s.shtml. 
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⸼ྰཷ⌮斖桀ⓗᢈኞ) [Reply on Whether the People’s Court Shall Accept the Civil Litigation 
on the Dispute Over Compensation and Relocation Where the Parties Concerned  
Failed to Reach an Agreement of Compensation and Relocation Regarding House  
Demolishment and Relocation] (Aug. 11, 2005), available at http://www.pkulaw.cn 
/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=chl&Gid=59600. 
140  See Current China Civ. P. Law, supra note 134. 
141  Minshi Susong Fa Xiuding: Lian Dengji Zhidu Baohu Dangshiren Suquan (Ẹ஦孱孤ἲ
ಟ孊㸸❧᱌Ⓩ存ไᗘಖ㉌ᙜ஦ே孱㛫) [Amendment to the Civil Procedure Law: Case Regis-
tration System Protects Rights to Trial], SOHU (Dec. 5, 2006), 
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142  See Current China Civ. P. Law, supra note 134, art. 123. 
1288 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:1261 
However, the requirement that a complaint include “specific claims, facts, 
and cause or causes” remains in place without clarification. This has led schol-
ars such as Nanping Liu to criticize the case filing system and conclude that the 
“case filing division is a gatekeeper that the Chinese leadership employs to 
keep things that embarrass it out of its courts.”143 Indeed, it was only in 2015 
that the Supreme People’s Court finally issued an opinion that specifically ad-
dressed the problem of case filing.144 Under this SPC Opinion, cases meeting 
the statutory condition shall be accepted for registration on the spot.145 Where 
decisions cannot be made on the spot regarding whether a case meets the statu-
tory condition or not, its acceptance for registration or not shall be decided 
within a time limit set by law.146 It is as yet unclear what effect this SPC Opin-
ion will have in light of the other changes in the civil procedure code. 
Indeed, viewing litigation as potentially vexatious, the most recent 2012 
Amendments now impose on Chinese litigants a requirement of good faith. To 
address an overburdened judiciary, the amendments also encourage greater 
management of cases through a multi-track system under which cases may be 
processed through one of several different tracks—simplified procedure, ordi-
nary procedure, or mediation. The decision on how to track the case is not a 
matter of party’s choice but rather, subject to the judge’s control. According to 
Chinese scholar Cai Yanmin, overburdened Chinese judges have expanded the 
use of simplified procedures and also increasingly pressed parties to reach set-
tlements, and steer cases towards mediation.147 
At the beginning of 2011, the Supreme People’s Court even created a spe-
cialized case management office in each court charged with supervising the 
daily affairs of the trial committee and case quality evaluation.148 Indexes 
weigh completion of cases heavily and courts able to finalize and mediate a 
higher number of cases are given a higher grade in the assessment. New judi-
cial supervision provisions were also added to empower procurators (prosecu-
tors) at the same level in addition to higher levels of state procurators, to super-
vise the work of the courts.149 This is another way in which Chinese courts’ 
authority is restrained vis-à-vis the state, but empowered vis-à-vis litigants. 
But so far, the recent amendments to China’s civil procedure rules have not 
achieved the goal of promoting harmony. While the amendments may have 
succeeded in decreasing the case docket by creating additional avenues for case 
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147  Cai Yanmin, supra note 122, at 46–47. 
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resolution, and refusing some litigants entry to the courts, petitions and com-
plaints about the courts continue. It was and is still quite common for litigants 
to contest final judgments through judicial supervision procedures and by peti-
tioning through letters and visits to state offices. In 2010, over one million con-
cluded cases were further challenged by letters, visits, and petitions.150 Some 
scholars have termed this “informed disenchantment,” as litigants’ disenchant-
ment grows with their greater experience with the courts.151 Without a full op-
portunity to be heard, Chinese litigants are extremely dissatisfied not only with 
the outcomes but also with the judicial process itself. 
Finally, and significantly, the most recent (2014–18) Five Year Reform 
Program for People’s Court as promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court al-
so signals efforts to centralize cases and reassert central government control.152 
This reaffirms China’s continuing emphasis on nation-building, as captured by 
the present Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s proclamation of the “Chinese Dream” 
as the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation (that of a strong China, a civi-
lized China, a harmonious China, and a beautiful China). 
And so, under the goal of “maintaining the unity of the nation’s laws,” the 
Supreme People’s Court has established circuit divisions that will handle major 
civil commercial and administrative cases that cross administrative regions.153 
So far, two circuit court divisions have been established with one sitting in 
Shenzhen, Guangdong Province with its circuit jurisdiction covering the three 
provinces/regions of Guangdong, Guangxi, and Hainan, and the second circuit 
court division in Shenyang, Liaoning Province with its circuit jurisdiction co-
vers the three provinces of Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang. These circuit 
court divisions are permanent divisions of the Supreme People’s Court with the 
same subject matter jurisdiction as the Supreme People’s Court and its judg-
ments, rulings, and decisions are considered to be those of the Supreme Peo-
ple’s Court. Importantly, these circuit court divisions will also handle petitions 
and visits to the Supreme People’s Court within their circuit region.154 
Interestingly, this is not unlike the historical circuit courts in the United 
States (composed of two Supreme Court Justices and a district judge of the dis-
trict) that rode the circuits to hear cases before their abolishment in 1891 with 
the establishment of the intermediate court of appeals.155 Like their U.S. coun-
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terparts, these circuit court divisions of the Supreme People’s Court will also 
“ride circuits” and travel within their circuit region to try cases and receive pe-
titioners. It is an effort to centralize and unify otherwise diverse geographic re-
gions by bringing the most powerful and highest court to the districts. As in the 
United States, it is the hope that these justices on circuit will become a crucial 
link between citizens and the judicial branch—as these justices will learn the 
diversity of the local conditions and citizens will gain greater confidence in the 
judiciary.156 
Additionally, the (2014–2018) Five Year Reform Program also anticipates 
experimenting with the establishment of lower trial courts with jurisdiction that 
will cross administrative regions that will be apart and separate from the pre-
sent provincial court structure. The idea is that these courts will hear cross-
jurisdictional cases such as environmental protection, food/drug safety, and en-
terprise bankruptcy and will remove these cases from provincial bias and “local 
protectionalism.”157 It is unclear whether these new lower trial courts that will 
cross administrative regions will replace the circuit courts. But it is a step-by-
step approach to consolidation into a central court system that will hopefully 
reduce local provincial influences and corruption. Such reform proposals spell 
perhaps a “fourth era of procedural reform” for China as well. 
CONCLUSION 
Legal procedure is not simply the practical way of securing the rule of law 
and ensuring the enforcement of substantive rights. Legal procedure also re-
flects our collective sense of justice. As enactments of the state, procedural re-
quirements are also symbolic messages from the state. How the courthouse 
gates are manned, in the instance of the United States and China, reflects great-
er national goals and the role of courts within those goals. 
As the first threshold in the legal process, pleading rules restrict or empow-
er courts in determining how a dispute is to be framed and what goes in and 
what stays out. As such, these rules inherently carry with them decisions about 
power distribution. In determining who has the obligation to do what in a litiga-
tion, procedural rules and statutes distribute power among parties, lawyers, and 
judges, as well as among different branches of government, state and national 
governments, rich and poor, corporations and individuals. Understanding the 
role of courts then must also mean understanding the effect (intended or other-
wise) of the procedural rules and statutes on power distribution. In both China 
and the United States, the power of litigation has shifted toward judges and 
away from litigants. 
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In the United States, lawsuits are valued as participatory justice. Some val-
ues served under this concept of participatory justice include enabling greater 
public knowledge on policy issues; forging the community development of 
norms; bringing outside voices into the application of top-down policies; and 
momentarily altering configurations of authority, as well as operating as a lev-
eler between defendants and plaintiffs. It may be said that the American legal 
system would prefer the doors be open to ordinary litigants because they are 
who should set and enforce the social norms. If civil litigation is expected to 
enable the participatory voices of “private attorney generals,” then there may be 
greater tolerance for allowing broad pleadings and in waiting for evidence to 
come out later. This was indeed the case for much of the last one hundred years 
in America. As Marc Galanter puts it, the United States legal system is charac-
terized by “soft, pluralized, participative, and expensive law, with more lawyers 
who play a more central and expansive role.”158 
By contrast, lawsuits in China are strictly for individual dispute resolution, 
and on a societal level, to preserve harmony and prevent social instability. Ra-
ther than serving as a site for rearranging social norms, litigation is used to 
channel social dispute and maintain stability. Unlike the United States, China 
may not want a civil justice system that is open to new and diverse claims, but 
rather, a system that provides predictability for business and commerce and is 
not swamped with frivolous claims. And so, the system has always had more 
restrictive requirements for its pleadings and placed obligations on judges to 
assess the claim at an initial stage of litigation. Even a short experiment with 
the adversary system resulted in a return to state control of litigation as the 
Chinese state seeks to ensure greater harmony in its population. 
However, both countries’ goals for civil litigation may not be met as access 
to the courthouse gate is diminished. The requirement of “plausibility” that 
places such discretion on American judges, along with broad jurisdiction, 
means that federal judges now have an unusually expansive reach to decide 
which cases and whose cases are heard. In China, these powers have always 
been retained by judges, and recent efforts to streamline cases have only in-
creased their authority. The resultant limits on access to courts and reduced 
control over lawsuits by litigants can cause a reduction of democracy in the 
United States as litigants’ voices are filtered out in the restructuring of norms, 
and disharmony in China as litigants’ voices are filtered out, leading to greater 
dissatisfaction and instability. Thus, Subrin and Main’s fourth era of civil pro-
cedure in the United States may also have great resonance with Chinese civil 
procedure reforms, as, in the end, both entailed an unintended undermining of 
both countries’ goals for their legal systems. 
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